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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
recently suggested that the decision may nullify some immuni-
ties granted to governmental bodies pursuant to section
895.43(3) with respect to their liability for the intentional torts
of their agents and employees since state created immunities





In House of Stainless v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,' the Wis-
consin Supreme Court considered for the first time the effect
of a perfected security interest containing an after-acquired
property clause on a seller's right pursuant to Wisconsin Stat-
utes section 402.702(2)2 to reclaim property sold on credit to a
buyer who was insolvent when the property was received.
Marshall & EIsley Bank (M&I) had entered into a security
agreement with Alkar Engineering on November 1, 1971 pro-
viding for a security interest in Alkar's inventory both pres-
ently owned and after-acquired. M&I also properly perfected
the security interest.3 House of Stainless Steel, Inc. (Stainless)
delivered goods to Alkar on credit in January, 1973. Stainless
discovered that Alkar had received this shipment of goods
while insolvent and accordingly Stainless made a written de-
mand for the return of the goods from Alkar. This demand
satisfied Wisconsin Statutes section 402.702(2), as it was pro-
perly made within ten days of the receipt of the goods by Alkar.
In spite of the fact that on January 17, 1973, Stainless had
given notice of this demand to M&I, the bank, acting pursuant
to the after-acquired property clause in its security agreement
with Alkar, sold the goods that Stainless was attempting to
50. Fine, Several Police Supervisor Immunities From State Court Suit May Be
Doomed By the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 50 Wis. B. BULL., Oct. 1977, 9-12.
1. 75 Wis. 2d 264, 249 N.W.2d 561 (1977).
2. Wis. STAT. § 402.702(2) (1971) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Where
the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may
reclaim the goods upon dei.iand made within 10 days after the receipt "
3. 75 Wis. 2d at 265, 249 N.W.2d at 562.
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reclaim to a third party on January 31, 1973.1
Stainless sued M&I for conversion of the goods. As affirma-
tive defenses, M&I contended that its security interest in the
inventory was superior to any interest that Stainless may have
had in the same goods and that Stainless did not have capacity
to sue. The trial court granted a motion by Stainless for sum-
mary judgment.5
On appeal, the supreme court quickly disposed of the con-
tention by M&I that Stainless could not bring this action be-
cause it did not have a certificate of authority to transact busi-
ness in Wisconsin as required by Wisconsin Statutes section
180.847(1).' The court noted that even though Stainless main-
tained an office in this state, the fact that any orders secured
in Wisconsin were subject to approval by Stainless' general
office in Chicago, the operations of Stainless fit squarely within
the statutory exception provided in Wisconsin Statutes section
180.801(4) .7 Accordingly, the court held: "It follows that Stain-
less was not required to secure a certificate of authority and is
entitled to bring this action in Wisconsin.""
The court next considered whether Stainless had any basis
to claim priority over M&I under the provisions of Wisconsin
Statutes section 409.312 which determines priority among con-
flicting interests in the same collateral. The facts were uncon-
troverted that M&I had a valid, perfected security interest
while, on the other hand, Stainless was not a secured party
because it had not filed any agreement or financing statement
covering the property it had shipped to Alkar. Because the
property involved was inventory' the priorities to the property
4. Id.
5. Id. at 265-66, 249 N.W.2d at 562.
6. Wis. STAT. § 180.847(1) (1971) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No foreign corporation transacting business in this state without a certificate of
authority, if a certificate of authority is required under this chapter, shall be
permitted to maintain or defend a cicil action or special proceeding in any court
of this state, until such corporation has obtained a certificate of authority.
7. Wis. STAT. § 180.801(4) (1971) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A] foreign corporation shall not be considered to be transacting business in
this state ...by reason of carrying on in this state any one or more of the
following activities:
(d) Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employes or
agents or otherwise, where such orders require acceptance without this state
before becoming binding contracts.




were to be determined by reference to Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 409.312(3). The court correctly concluded that while a
perfected purchase money security interest is entitled to prior-
ity over a conflicting security interest in inventory, "[s]ince
Stainless does not have a perfected purchase money security
interest, sec. 409.312, Stats., provides no basis for a priority
claim in the property sold by it to Alkar."'
Stainless' remaining theory to support its claim against
M&I was that as a seller of goods on credit who had made a
timely demand to reclaim the goods, Stainless was entitled to
the proceeds of the goods that had been resold by M&I. The
court recognized that a seller has a right to reclaim under Wis-
consin Statutes section 402.702(2) but also pointed out that the
right to reclaim is subject to exception where "the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser"" are
involved. Accordingly, the issue was narrowed to "whether
M&I is a 'good faith purchaser' and thus within the exception
to the right of reclamation granted by sec. 402.702, Stats. '1 2
In resolving this question the court adopted the reasoning
used to resolve a similar issue in In re Hayward Woolen Co., ,3
a 1967 Massachusetts case. In that case, the sellers who had
delivered goods to a bankrupt buyer sought to reclaim the
goods while a creditor with a perfected security interest in the
bankrupt's after-acquired inventory claimed priority. The
Hayward court ruled that the secured creditor was a "good
faith purchaser for value" and therefore the sellers could not
exercise any reclamation right against that party.'4
The supreme court capsulized the reasoning in Hayward in
the following manner: (1) A person with voidable title can
transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value;' 5 (2) an
insolvent buyer has voidable title; (3) a security interest in
after-acquired collateral qualifies one as a purchaser;'" (4) a
10. Id. at 271, 249 N.W.2d at 565.
11. Id. at 270, 249 N.W.2d at 564, citing Wis. STAT. § 402.702(3) (1971).
12. 75 Wis. 2d at 271, 249 N.W.2d at 565.
13. 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1107 (D. Mass. Ref. 1967).
14. Id. at 1111-12.
15. Wis. STAT. § 402.403(1) (1971).
16. The court cited Wis. STAT. §§ 401.201(32), (33) (1971) which provide: "(32)
'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue
or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.
(33) 'Purchaser' means a person who takes by purchase."
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pre-existing claim is value.17
The court also cited First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Academic Archives"8 in support of the same proposition. While
both of the cited cases found that the holder of a perfected
security interest in after-acquired property qualified as a good
faith purchaser, it is interesting to note that reaching this re-
sult was made simpler by the fact that the good faith of the
secured parties was never put in issue in either case. 9
A potentially distinguishing fact in the House of Stainless
case was that M&I clearly had notice of the claim by Stainless
before the goods were sold.2" This actual notice to M&I could
have put the bank's good faith in question. Although the res-
pondent maintained generally that M&I could not be a good
faith purchaser, the question of this notice was not specifically
addressed. 21
This is not to say that a different result would be warranted
because notice was given to M&I. For example, in In re Samu-
els & Co."2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, considered the
situation of a secured creditor who had notice of a reclaiming
seller's claim after the security interest was perfected but be-
fore the secured party sought to exercise any rights in the col-
lateral. In resolving the priority question the court held that it
was not necessary to prove lack of knowledge of any third party
claims in order for a secured party to qualify as a good faith
purchaser under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 2 Instead, the court suggested that a secured party would
be a good faith purchaser and therefore insulated from any
claims of a reclaiming seller as long as the security agreement
itself was not the product of bad faithY
The court's ruling in House of Stainless emphasizes the
importance of properly perfecting a security interest pursuant
17. Wis. STAT. § 401.201(44) (1971).
18. 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850 (1971).
19. In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1111; First Citizens Banks
& Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, 10 N.C. App. at -, 179 S.E.2d at 853.
20. 75 Wis. 2d at 265, 249 N.W.2d at 562.
21. See Brief for Respondent at 35-37, House of Stainless v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,
75 Wis. 2d 264, 249 N.W.2d 561 (1977).
22. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
23. Id. at 1243-44, where the court said: "[Tihe Code's definition of an Article Two
good faith purchaser does not expressly or impliedly include lack of knowledge of third-
party claims as an element."
24. Id. at 1243.
1977]
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to Wisconsin Statutes chapter 409. Although equitable consid-
erations may seem to lean in favor of an unsuspecting seller
seeking to reclaim under Wisconsin Statutes section
402.702(2), this decision suggests that the prudent practitioner
in Wisconsin should carefully protect his interests by properly
perfecting a purchase money security interest in the goods sold.
As the appeals court noted in the Samuels case, "The loss
could have been avoided through his own [the seller's] efforts.
This is not the kind of loss equity protects against. '2
II. CONTRACT ENFORCEABILITY-STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The court construed the part performance exception to the
Uniform Commercial Code statute of frauds in Gerner v.
Vasby.28 This case arose as a result of a dispute over the sale
of grain by the plaintiff Willard Gerner to Vasby Farms Grain
Service operated by Helmer and Joannes Vasby. Gerner and
Joannes Vasby had a telephone conversation in April of 1973
and discussed the sale of corn by Gerner to Vasby. Vasby testi-
fied that he had agreed to buy corn from Gerner to be delivered
at a later date and that the price agreed upon for this corn was
$1.25 per bushel for 10,000 bushels. Gerner on the other hand
claimed that there was not a contract because Vasby had told
Gerner that he would send him a contract for his acceptance
or rejection. Gerner received only a confirmation slip which he
never signed or returned. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's finding that an oral contract existed between the parties
because such a finding was not "contrary to the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence."
Having affirmed the existence of the contract, the issue
became whether the contract was enforceable. As the trial
court had pointed out, the statute of frauds generally provides
that a contract for the sale of goods for the price of more than
$500.00 is unenforceable unless it is written.28 However, Wis-
25. Id. at 1248.
26. 75 Wis. 2d 660, 250 N.W.2d 319 (1977).
27. Id. at 665, 250 N.W.2d at 323.
28. The statute of frauds is embodied in Wis. STAT. § 402.201 (1971) which pro-
vides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
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consin Statutes section 402.201(3) contains several conditions
that render an oral contract enforceable even though the stat-
ute of frauds had not been complied with, and accordingly the
court turned its attention to that statute. In particular, the
court considered whether the oral contract was enforceable
under section 402.201(3) (c) 29 which allows for an enforceable
oral contract with respect to goods "which have been received
and accepted."
Because Gerner had delivered the corn to Vasby and Vasby
had accepted the corn, the court held that such conduct consti-
tuted part performance under section 402.201(3)(c). Therefore,
the contract was enforceable. The court was careful to point out
that "receipt and acceptance" called for in the statute must
involve more than the unilateral act of the buyer. Although
acceptance alone is a unilateral act, receipt and acceptance are
separate acts,30 receipt involving a change in possession or
physical custody of the goods.3 ' Noting that there can be no
receipt without a delivery but that Gerner delivered the corn
to Vasby and Vasby accepted, the court held that there was
part performance since the receipt and acceptance consisted of
"conduct of a bilateral nature. 32
Gerner further contended that the part performance found
by the court could not make the contract enforceable because
it was not "exclusively referable" to the alleged oral contract.
3
Prior cases in Wisconsin considering the part performance ex-
ception to the statute of frauds had consistently held that: "To
constitute part performance, the facts that the party demand-
ing specific performance must rely upon are required to be
exclusively referable to the contract. '34
29. Wis. STAT. § 402.201(3)(c) provides: "A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of sub. (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable: . . .With
respect to goods for which payment has been made or accepted or which have been
received and accepted (s. 402.606)."
30. 75 Wis. 2d at 667-68, 250 N.W.2d at 324, citing 2 A. CORaIN, CONTRACTS § 482
at 640 (1963) which reads: "Acceptance is the unilateral act of the buyer alone, or of
his personal representative; it requires no action or expression on the part of the seller."
31. Id. at 668, citing 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 486 at 648-49 (1963) which reads:
Receipt, on the other hand, is a change in the physical relations of those specific
goods to the seller and to the buyer. . . .If the court finds that there has been
a change in actual "custody" of the goods, it will also find that there has been
"receipt by the buyer."
32. 75 Wis. 2d at 668-69, 250 N.W.2d at 324.
33. Id. at 669, 250 N.W.2d at 324-25.
34. Wiegand v. Gissal, 28 Wis. 2d 488, 495, 137 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1966) (emphasis
19771
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Gerner asserted that because he had dealt with Vasby in the
past and because he usually dealt with Vasby on the basis of
Vasby paying the current market price on the day of delivery
without any previous agreement between the parties, that
therefore his conduct was equally attributable to these past
dealings. The contention was that the statute of frauds would
render the oral contract unenforceable because the conduct was
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral contract.35
However, the court cited the 1975 case of Toulon v. Nagle36
and noted that although that case held that conduct which was
"exclusively referable" to the oral contract would of course
constitute part performance, the Toulon case did not say that
it was not possible for other conduct to qualify as part perform-
ance. 7 This reading of the Toulon case seems somewhat
strained for the court said in that case, "[tihe performance
must be exclusively referable to the contract or be performance
which is reasonably to be anticipated in reliance on the con-
tract." 3 In addition, the Toulon court cited several other cases
as precedent in support of the same rule.39
The court's decision in Gerner v. Vasby seems to signifi-
cantly expand the part performance doctrine as it had existed
prior to the Uniform Commercial Code in Wisconsin. The court
relied upon a portion of the official comment to Wisconsin
Statutes section 402.20111 and held that it is not required that
conduct be "exclusively referable" to the oral contract which
added). Accord, Bunbury v. Krauss, 41 Wis. 2d 522, 164 N.W.2d 473 (1969); Pick
Foundry, Inc. v. General Door Mfg. Co., 262 Wis. 311, 55 N.W.2d 407 (1952); Kelly v.
Sullivan, 252 Wis. 52, 30 N.W. 2d 209 (1947).
35. 75 Wis. 2d at 669, 250 N.W.2d at 324-25.
36. 67 Wis. 2d 233, 226 N.W.2d 480 (1975).
37. 75 Wis. 2d at 669, 250 N.W.2d at 325.
38. 67 Wis. 2d at 248, 226 N.W.2d at 488-89 (emphasis added).
39. The court in Toulon cited Bunbury v. Krauss, 41 Wis. 2d 522, 164 N.W.2d 473
(1969) and Pick Foundry, Inc. v. General Door Mfg. Co., 262 Wis. 311, 55 N.W.2d 407
(1952).
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.201 (West 1964) contains the Official UCC Comment
which provides in part:
2. "Partial Performance" as a substitute for the required memorandum can
validate the contract only for the goods which have been accepted or for which
payment has been made and accepted.
Receipt and acceptance either of goods or of the price constitutes an unambi-
guous overt admission by both parties that a contract actually exists. . . .This
is true even though the actions of the parties are not in themselves inconsistent
with a different transaction such as a consignment for resale or a mere loan of
money.
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is sought to be enforced. Instead, "where the conduct which is
relied upon for part performance is consistent with the contract
such conduct is sufficient to take the contract out of the statute
of frauds even though such conduct is not inconsistent with
some other dealings arguably had between the parties."'"
JAMES G. DE JONG
CRIMINAL LAW
I. INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Within the space of eight weeks the Wisconsin Supreme
Court gave conflicting interpretations to the meaning of
"involuntarily produced" intoxication as it pertains to Wiscon-
sin Statutes section 939.42. The statute provides:
Intoxication. An intoxicated or a drugged condition of the
actor is a defense only if such condition:
(1) Is involuntarily produced and renders the actor incap-
able of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to
the alleged criminal act at the time the act is committed; or
(2) Negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to
the crime.
In Staples v. State' the defendant, whose principal defense
was intoxication, was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, bur-
glary and operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in restricting the evidence offered by the defendant in an at-
tempt to prove his chronic alcoholism.
The court, relying upon Roberts v. State,2 stated that proof
of alcoholism, when "established by expert medical opinion,"3
could be relevant. "Alcoholism, in itself, is not now and never
has been a separate defense to criminal liability in this
state. . . .This court has, however, recognized that proof of
alcoholism may be relevant to the defense of involuntary intox-
41. 75 Wis. 2d at 670, 250 N.W.2d at 325.
1. 74 Wis. 2d 13, 245 N.W.2d 679 (1976).
2. 41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969).
3. 74 Wis. 2d at 20, 245 N.W.2d at 683.
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